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Abstract 
Preferential feed-in tariffs (FITs) for solar generated electricity increases the demand for solar 
photovoltaic systems. They can thus induce price to increase, creating the potential for PV 
systems producers to collect rents. This paper analyses the interactions between feed-in 
tariffs, silicon prices and module prices, using weekly price data and FIT values in Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and France from January 2005 to May 2012. Relying methodologically on the 
Granger causality tests applied to vector autoregressive models, we show that since the end of 
the period of silicon shortage in 2009, module price variations cause changes in FITs, and not 
the reverse.  This is good news as it suggests that the regulators have been able to prevent 
FITs to inflate module prices. 
Key words: solar photovoltaic energy, feed-in tariffs, photovoltaic panel price 
JEL codes: Q40, Q48 
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1 Introduction  
Preferential feed-in tariffs (FITs, hereafter) for solar generated electricity are the most 
common policy tools to stimulate the installation of solar photovoltaic (PV) generation 
capacities, particularly in Europe and Japan, but also in a growing number of emerging 
economies such as China and India2. This mechanism works by setting guaranteed prices at 
which grid operators is obliged to buy electricity from solar energy sources. Solar PV 
generated power is offered a higher price relative to other sources, reflecting higher costs. The 
mark-up can be substantial, even compared with other renewable energy sources like wind. 
For example, the FIT in Germany for rooftop mounted PV installations was about 24 €-
ct/kWh in 2012, compared to less than 9 €-ct for onshore wind. This price premium is 
financed by the consumers’ electricity bill. 
A direct consequence of FITs is to stimulate the demand for PV systems and services. The 
economic law of supply and demand then predict that this will increase prices in these 
upstream markets, at least in the short-run. The price impacts are more complicated in the 
long-run because increased installation capacity can generate learning-by-doing effects and 
lead to cost reductions and hence lower prices. In the absence of fierce competition, FITs can 
then generate rents for PV systems producers and/or for the companies installing those 
systems. Obviously, the regulators in charge of setting the level of the tariffs seek to avoid 
such windfall profits by keeping FITs as close as possible to the cost of solar-generated 
                                                 
2
 A notable exception is the US in which 29 states have opted instead for the use of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS). RPS are mandates requiring each utility to have a minimum percentage of power that is sold or 
produced by renewable energy sources. That is, the PRS is a quantity instrument in contrast to the FIT which is a 
price instrument. 
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electricity, but this is not an easy task as they are not perfectly informed about production and 
installation costs. 
This paper seeks to contribute towards understanding the impact of FITs on the PV price 
dynamics. We focus on the interactions between the FITs and two upstream markets: the 
market of PV panels and the market of polysilicon. Using time series of FITs, panel and 
polysilicon prices, our main aim is to test whether FITs influence panel prices or vice versa. 
The latter would imply the regulators adjust the level of FITs in order to reduce rents. The 
analysis takes into account the role of polysilicon price, the main material input for panels 
production – previous analysis on the period of polysilicon shortage before 2009 showed that 
its price significantly influences the panel price, and consequently on the PV experience 
curves (de la Tour et al., 2013). 
The panel data used for this analysis consists of weekly polysilicon and module spot price, 
and FITs values in Germany, Italy, France and Spain from January 2005 to May 2012. To 
focus on market effects, we control for underlying long-term cost drivers, as measured by the 
experience effect. Methodologically, we use vector autoregressive variable (VAR) models 
and Granger causality tests to find the direction of the causality between the variables. We 
also study variations of module price around a FIT decrease with polynomial growth models. 
Evidence on how FITs influence panel price is critical information for policy makers for 
several reasons. To begin with, the problem is of significant economic importance as panel 
prices represent about forty percent of the overall cost of PV electricity generation. The fact 
that FITs potentially induce a transfer from the electricity consumers who finance the FITs to 
panel producers becomes extremely sensitive in several industrialized countries as the bulk of 
world PV panels production is located in China. High rents can also induce market 
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overheating which is costly and often followed by drastic production cuts, which harm the 
industry’s long-term development as illustrated by the French or Spanish cases. Last, the 
potential increase of panel prices reduces the effectiveness of FITs as it increases the overall 
cost of PV systems. 
Panel prices reflect production costs, plus margin. Cost are driven by technical factors, such 
as scale effect, R&D, learning-by-doing brought by the accumulation of experience. In 
contrast, the profit margin component - the difference between price and cost - are more 
driven by market based elements, such as competition, demand and supply balance and 
strategic behaviours. A substantial amount of literature focuses on the analysis and prediction 
of the cost of solar PV modules and systems using several methodologies: econometric 
estimation of learning curves (Yu et al., 2011; Poponi, 2003), expert elicitation surveys 
(Bosetti  et al., 2012), and engineering studies (Nemet, 2006; Branker et al., 2011). 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no academic work to date on pricing issues, and more 
specifically on the interactions between FITs and panel prices. These market effects issues 
are, however, often mentioned in the grey literature. Hayward and Graham (2011) suggest 
that second to the experience effect, market forces such as demand/supply imbalance or input 
price are responsible for recent deviation in module price from the historical trend.  
This paper provides descriptive statistics which show that the evolutions of FITs and module 
price are strongly correlated. Moreover, the econometric analysis shows that since 2009, the 
direction of causality is from panel price to FITs and not the reverse. This result suggests that 
regulators were able to adjust tariffs levels according to the module price, thereby limiting the 
rents collected by panel manufacturers. This result is in line with the prevailing fierce 
competition observed in the module manufacturing market which has helped bridge the gap 
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between cost and price. We also examine the very short-term effects of changes in FIT levels, 
and show that module prices tend to increase before FITs decrease, indicating that firms’ 
anticipate policy changes and this influences their pricing strategies. However, this effect is 
temporary. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the analytical 
framework and the hypothesis that are tested later on. The dataset is presented in Section 3 
together with a first correlation analysis. Section 4 aims at finding the direction of the 
causality to test the hypotheses set out by the analytical framework.  In Section 5, we analyse 
the influence of past and future FIT changes on module prices using polynomial growth 
models. Section 6 concludes. 
2    Background and tested assumptions  
Before introducing a simple framework used to formulate hypothesis about the influence of 
FITs and silicon price on module price, it is worth describing briefly the crystalline PV 
production chain. Panel production from silicon involves several steps. The silicon is 
crystallised, forming ingots which are sliced into wafers. The wafers are processes and 
assembled by pairs into cells, which are soldered and encapsulated to build modules. Then the 
deployment of the PV system requires combining the modules with complementary 
equipment (such as batteries and inverters) into integrated systems which, once installed, can 
generate power. In 2006, modules on average accounted for 40% of the cost of installed PV 
systems globally. 
The upstream production of polysilicon is a key step in the PV chain, given silicon is the 
main material input and accounts for 20% of the module costs. This stage also accounts for 
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the largest share of the energy use in PV production. Other material inputs – glass, aluminium 
and silver - account for a small part of the manufacturing cost and/or have stable prices. 
Polysilicon is a commodity: Once silicon exceeds the minimum purity level of 999.999%, this 
leaves little room for product differentiation. Firms instead compete on price. The intensity of 
competition is, however, strongly influenced by production capacity, which is constrained 
since it takes two years to build a production plant. To illustrate this point, silicon shortage 
gave considerable market power to silicon producers during this pre-2009 period, leading to a 
dramatic price increase. Since the price peak, overcapacity has prevailed and prices declined 
as a consequence. We come back on the evolution of the silicon market below. 
 To a large extent, crystalline PV panels are also commodities, but its supply is capacity 
constrained to a lesser extent. Rather, supply is a function of the experience effect which 
steadily reduces cost through accumulation of experience. The price of silicon is also a 
potential driver; this hypothesis will be tested below.  
Figure 1: Crystalline photovoltaic production chain 
 
 
 
Source: de la Tour et al. (2011) 
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We formulate four assumptions – represented in Figure 2 - which will be tested in the rest of 
the paper: 
Hypothesis 1a: FITs follow module price, reducing rents in the downstream segments of the 
industry, i.e. PV systems installation and electricity production.  
Hypothesis 1b: FITs influence module price, a higher FIT leading to increasing module 
prices and creating rents in the cell and module production segments. The causality is the 
reverse of Hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 2a: Silicon producers are price setters. They can pass through silicon price 
increase to module prices. This implies that silicon prices should be used as an exogenous 
variable in models predicting module price. 
Hypothesis 2b: Silicon producers are price takers. Since module production is the main 
market for silicon (87% in 2011, SolarBuzz 2012), a module price variation changes the 
demand for silicon, thus impacting its price. 
 
Figure 2: Our four hypotheses 
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3 Descriptive statistics 
The hypotheses formulated in the preceding section are tested with a dataset of weekly 
silicon and module spot prices from PV Insight3, and FITs values in Germany, Italy, France, 
and Spain (various sources, listed in Annex 1). The time series start in January 2005 and end 
in May 2012. 
As Table 1 indicates, silicon and module price have been very unstable during the period 
considered, with a standard deviation of 75% of the mean for silicon price, and 38% for 
module price. This is illustrated by Figure 3 representing silicon and module price evolutions 
during our sample period. Silicon price increased markedly from 56 $/kg in 2005 to 396 $/kg 
in 2008. This corresponds to a period of global silicon shortage from 2005 to 2009. 
Meanwhile, module prices also increased from 2.55 $/Wp in 2005 to 3.56 $/Wp in 2008. 
                                                 
3
 http://pvinsights.com/  
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From July 2009 on, prices are much more stable, with silicon prices returning to January 2005 
levels, indicating the end of the silicon shortage. 
Silicon and module price are highly synchronised (the correlation coefficient is 0.91). At the 
same time, the rate of price increase is considerably lower for modules (40%) compared to 
silicon (607%). Two facts explain this observation: First, silicon price represents only 20% of 
a module’s total cost4. Second, silicon is sold by and large through long-term contracts (about 
80%, Photon Consulting 2012), thus the average purchase price did not rise in the same 
proportions as the spot price (143%, from 51$/kg to 124$/kg , Photon Consulting 2012). 
The high correlation between silicon and module price, however, does not provide 
indication of the direction of the causality between the two variables; that is, which of the two 
hypotheses  - 2a and 2b - holds true. 
Table 1 Summary statistics of module and silicon price data (Data source: PV Insight) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
silicon 387 168 127 24.1 396 
module 387 2.57 0.98 0.84 4.60 
 
                                                 
4
 Source: Photon consulting annual report 2012, p. 154. 
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 Figure 3 Silicon and PV modules spot price evolution from January 2005 to May 2012 
  
 
Turning next to feed-in tariffs, we collected weekly values of FITs in Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and France from January 2005 to May 2012. Other countries are not considered 
because they implemented alternative PV technology development policies (RPS, investment 
subsidies, etc.) such as in Japan or the US, or they do not account for a significant share of the 
global market. The four countries included in the study covers more than 60% of the global 
market over the sample period.  
Among the four countries studied, different tariffs are set for different types of PV sytems 
(ground based, commercial, residential, etc.). We therefore calculate the average value 
weighted by the market share of each type in any given period. On the period considered, 
there have been 11 changes to FIT levels in Germany, 14 in Italy, 6 in Spain, and 9 in France. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average FIT for Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. It 
indicates that the German and Italian FITs have been decreasing steadily, while more chaotic 
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variation was observed in the Spanish and French markets. Table 3 shows the correlation of 
module price with the average FIT in the four countries studied. It indicates that the German 
and Italian FITs are not only more stable than the Spanish and French ones, but also more 
correlated to module prices. But once again, this gives no information about the direction of 
the causality, which is investigated in next section. 
 
Figure 4 Average FIT evolution in the main countries 
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Table 2 Correlation table of module price and countries FITs 
 
German FIT Italian FIT Spanish FIT French FIT 
Module price 0.86 0.76 0.67 0.39 
 
 
How does the evolution of panel prices compare to that of the FITs implemented in the 
various countries? The comparison is not straightforward as the two variables are not 
expressed in the same unit: FITs correspond to the price of a quantity of electricity (in 
$/kWh), while module prices corresponds to the price of a production capacity (in $/kWp5). 
To allow comparison, we convert the module price into the net present value of the electricity 
generated over its lifetime by a module of a standard capacity of 1kWp and sold at this FIT. 
The net present value of the electricity generated by the module in country i is given by the 
usual formula: 
 
,  	
, ∑ 	∗	              (1)
where 	
, is the feed-in tariff in country i at time t. T is the lifetime of the PV system, r is 
the discount rate. The product !	 ∗ 	"#	 is the electricity produced each year in country i by 
the PV system, with !, the Performance Ratio of the installation (the ratio of the actual and 
theoretically possible energy output) and, ASI, the Annual Solar Irradiation (the sum of the 
quantity of solar energy reaching the installation over a year) which is country-specific. 
                                                 
5
 Watt-peak (Wp) is a measure of the nominal power of a photovoltaic device under 
laboratory illumination conditions. 
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We take the following values for the different parameters: a discount rate of 10%, a 
lifetime of 25 years, and a performance ratio of 0.75. The ASI is assumed to be 1200 
kWh/kWp/year for Germany, 1500 for Italy, 1700 for Spain, and 1350 for France6. 
The net present value of electricity given by Equation (1) needs to be compared to the price 
of the whole PV system, of which in 2011 the panel price accounted for around 40% (Photon 
Consulting, 2012). To obtain the price of a PV system, we add to the module price, the price 
of other components such as the inverter, wire and mounting system. Weekly values of the 
prices of other components are computed using the annual price trends obtained from Photon 
international (2012). 
For each country, Figure 5 compares the cost of a PV system (the shaded area) with the net 
present values of the electricity produced by a PV system sold at the national FIT. It shows 
that the German FIT follows PV system price the most closely. In contrast, important 
divergences can be observed between the FIT and module price in 2007/2008 in Spain and in 
2009/2010 in France, following the uncontrolled developments of the PV market and the 
subsequent sharp FIT cuts. The significant gap in 2010/2011 in Italy can also be explained by 
the fast market growth during this period, which multiplied by 13 in two years, from 720 MW 
in 2009 to 9300 MW in 2011 according to the  EPIA (2012). Note that additional incentive 
policies such as tax rebates are not taken into account here but act to further increase the 
attractiveness of PV systems. 
   
                                                 
6
 Source : solarGIS website http://solargis.info/ 
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Figure 5 Comparison of PV systems price (shaded area) with the value of the FIT corresponding 
to all the electricity produced by a PV system over its lifetime (line) 
 
 
4 Econometric methodology 
In this section, we further analyse the interdependencies by disentangling the causal 
relationships. We test the hypotheses represented in Figure 2: (1a) Do FITs follow module 
price closely? (1b) Do FITs cause module price by driving the demand? (2a) Are silicon 
producer price makers? Or (2b) price takers? 
As we make no assumption about the direction of the causal relationships for now, all the 
variables are endogenous in an econometric sense. The only equations that can be estimated 
are then one variable written as a function of its own lagged values and the lagged values of 
all the other variables. Those equations make up a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model. 
Furthermore, “real” causality cannot be identified with econometric tools. Therefore we adopt 
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the definition of Granger (Granger, 1969):  x “granger causes” y if the prediction of the 
current value of y is enhanced by the knowledge of past values of x. In the following sections, 
as “causes” we mean “granger causes”. Granger developed a methodology based on VAR 
models to test for this causality. We use this test to identify causality among the variables. 
As mentioned before, the module price is made of a cost and a margin. The former is 
influenced by long-term drivers, in particular learning-by-doing improvements that need to be 
controlled for, in order to focus on market effects. We do so by adopting the learning curve 
theory which predicts that learning-by-doing decreases price through the accumulation of 
experience measured by cumulative production, according to the following  formula: 
 
$%&'()  $%&'()* ∗ + ,'$_./%&,'$_./%&*0
12
 
(2)
Here,  $%&'() is module price at time t. ,'$_./%& is the cumulative PV module 
production at the same date7. to is an arbitrarily chosen reference date. E is the experience 
parameter, measuring the intensity of the learning-by-doing process. Equation (2) is usually 
estimated econometrically. In this paper, we use an experience parameter of 0.338, 
corresponding to a learning rate8 of 20.1%, which has been estimated in the study by de la 
Tour et al. (2013) who used the same data. 
                                                 
7
 Since the learning effect is a slow process which cannot be affected to the production of a 
particular week or even month, we create a proxy for weekly cumulative production following 
the yearly production trend obtained from Photon Consulting (2012). 
8
 A learning rate of 20.1 means that unit cost decreases by 20.1% for each doubling of 
cumulative production. 
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Using data on cumulative production9, we are able to predict the value of $%&'()* , which 
is the module price equivalent to $%&'() 	if no learning would have happened since 34. We 
denote $%&'()4 , the corresponding predicted value. 
We also create a variable 	
, the average of countries’ FITs, weighted by the size of the 
national electricity markets: 
 
	
  ∑ 	
, ∗ )(),,    (3)
where )(),, is the size of the electricity market of country i at time t. 
Then we apply the VAR model to the first order derivative of the logarithm of module 
price, silicon price, and FIT with a lag equal to l. This gives: 
 
6. 7 	 	∑ 89 	6. 719:9 ; E,       (4)
In this equation, 6. 7 is the vector of the first order derivatives of the three price variables 
which are logged: ln$%&'()4, ln?@(@,%A, and ln	
. 	89 is the vector of parameters to 
be estimated and E@ is the vector of error terms, assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed. 
The estimation is done by running a separate regression for each variable, regressing it on 
lags of itself and all other variables, using ordinary least squares (OLS). A Dickey-Fuller test 
for unit root shows that the time series are not stationary, even when a trend is allowed, but 
they are first-order stationary. This explains why we apply the VAR model to the first-order 
derivatives of the variables. A Clemonte-Montañés-Reyes test for unit root, allowing for one 
or two breaks in the time series, points out a break in the fourth week of September for 
                                                 
9
 Photon consulting annual reports 
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ln?@(@,%A (see Annex 2). We therefore run the regressions of the VAR models on two 
periods: before and after 24/09/2009. The first period corresponds to the silicon shortage, 
while the second period starts after this event. The optimal lags are found by maximizing the 
AIC information criterion; 2 weeks during the silicon shortage, and 3 weeks after. 
5 Results 
The model (4) is estimated during and after the silicon shortage. The regression 
coefficients are all significant at the standard significance levels. Tables 4 and 5 show the 
results of Granger causality tests applied to the estimations of the model during the silicon 
shortage between January 2005 and July 2009 (Table 4) and after the shortage (Table 5). The 
grey boxes correspond to the cases where the null hypothesis - that the excluded variable does 
not cause the dependant variable - is rejected at a 0.05 significance level.  
Consider first, the causality between silicon and module price. There is a switch at the end 
of the silicon shortage period. During the silicon shortage period, silicon price causes module 
price (hypothesis 2b), while after the end of the shortage, the opposite holds (hypothesis 2a). 
These results are completely in line with economic theory which predict that, in commodity 
markets, producers have market power only in case of under capacity of production. The shift 
in market power from silicon producers to module manufacturers can also be due to the PV 
industry becoming a more and more important market for silicon, overtaking the semi-
conductor  industry since 2007 (SolarBuzz 2012). 
Results on the causality between module price and FITs are more ambiguous. During the 
first period, the Granger test does not yield any conclusion regarding causal relationships, at 
least at the 5% or even the 10% significance level. After July 2009, FIT still does not cause 
module price, but the test indicates that silicon price causes FITs. As module price causes 
18 
 
silicon price, we can conclude that the module price indirectly causes FITs (hypothesis 1a). 
This can be interpreted as a consequence of the fierce competition prevailing in the cell and 
module market, keeping prices close to production costs, preventing producers from 
collecting rent from attractive FITs. 
Looking at Figure 4 helps understand why module price causes FITs after 2009 but not 
before. Before 2009, FITs were very stable, modified only once a year in Germany, and even 
less frequently in other countries. Their level was set well in advance, sometimes years 
ahead10. FITs were thus very rigid, explaining why they couldn’t follow module price closely. 
After 2009, however, FITs became much more flexible with intra-year adjustments, 
sometimes unscheduled, to follow module price more closely. Moreover, volume responsive 
systems have been implemented including the FIT corridor in Germany in 2009 and in France 
in 2011, further enhancing the flexibility. The fact that FITs track module price more closely 
in the recent years should then be interpreted as a consequence of a modification of the FITs 
schemes. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Granger causality test results for the period of the silicon shortage 
Dependent variable Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
ln$%&'()4  ln?@(@,%A  22.48 2 0.000 
                                                 
10
 This was adapted to the steady and predictable price decrease triggered by the 
experience effect before the silicon shortage. 
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ln	
  0.120 2 0.942 
ALL 22.76 4 0.000 
ln?@(@,%A  
ln$%&'()4  1.373 2 0.503 
ln	
  0.078 2 0.962 
ALL 1.468 4 0.832 
ln	
  
ln$%&'()4  0.724 2 0.696 
ln?@(@,%A  4.288 2 0.117 
ALL 7.046 4 0.133 
  
Table 4 Granger causality test results for the period after the silicon shortage 
Dependent variable Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
ln$%&'()4  
ln?@(@,%A  3.090 3 0.378 
ln	
  2.722 3 0.436 
ALL 7.006 6 0.320 
ln?@(@,%A  
ln$%&'()4  17.47 3 0.001 
ln	
  0.567 3 0.904 
ALL 18.69 6 0.005 
ln	
  
ln$%&'()4  1.518 3 0.678 
ln?@(@,%A  19.73 3 0.000 
ALL 21.50 6 0.001 
 
 
6 Anticipations of feed-in tariffs change 
VAR models use past values as explanatory variables, while FITs are announced, and 
therefore anticipated, months or even years ahead. This section further investigates the FITs’ 
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effect on module price, by analysing the effect of future FIT changes on module price. Our 
approach examines the variation of module price before a FIT decrease (which occurred 24 
times during the period considered). A simple theoretical reasoning suggests that firms would 
anticipate a decrease of FIT by purchasing more modules before the change to benefit from 
the higher FIT, which eventually increases price. Anecdotal evidence supports this 
assumption. For instance, the observation of monthly PV installation levels and the FIT 
evolution in Germany depicted in Figure 6 clearly indicates that peaks of installation, 
measured by the number of connections to the grid, arise in the months before the FIT 
decreases. 
 While Figure 6 describes the impact of anticipations on quantities, what about the impact 
on module prices? To answer this question, we build a difference-in-difference indicator to 
measure short-term price variations: the variable &)B@C3@%A is the deviation of the first order 
derivative11 of module price compared to a business as usual (BAU) scenario at date t: 
 &)B@C3@%A ≡ 6.$%&'() E 6.$%&'()FG       (5)
If &)B@C3@%A is positive, this indicates that the increase in module price in week t exceeds 
the BAU scenario prediction. 
                                                 
11
 We use its first-order derivative because, contrary to $%&'(), the derivative is 
stationary. 
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Figure 6 Impact of the feed-in tariff reductions on monthly capacity addition in Germany 
 
Source: Enerdata, from German Ministry for Environment, SolarWirtshaft 
 
We rely on results from Section 4.4 to calculate the BAU price. They say that module 
pricing obeys to different rules during and after the silicon shortage. During the silicon 
shortage, the price is driven by the silicon price. We thus assume the following relationship: 
 
       
(6)
The length of the lag of silicon price used is two weeks as found optimal in Section 4.4. 
After the silicon shortage, the BAU price is assumed constant: 
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(7)
Regression results of (6) and (7) are presented in the Appendix. 
Using the indicator , we indeed observe a positive effect during the few months 
before a FIT decrease, and a negative one afterwards. This is illustrated in Figure 7, showing 
the evolution of the variable  over a 1 year-period around a FIT decrease which 
occurred simultaneously in Germany and Italy on January 1st 2007.  
 
Figure 7: Deviation of module price compared to a business as usual scenario before and after a 
FIT decrease in January 2007. 
 
 
In order to gain further understanding of the dynamic effect of a FIT decrease on module 
prices, we now estimate a polynomial growth model. This explains the deviation of module 
price by a polynomial function of the time before the following FIT decrease. The regression 
equation is:  
-0,01
0
0,01
Deviation
t
FIT decrease
Positive effect
Negative effect
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 &)B@C3@%A  ∑ 	HIH)J%/)I 	;KI L																																			         (8)
where H)J%/) is the number of weeks before the following FIT decrease. L  is the usual 
i.i.d error term. The observation of Figure 7 suggests that polynomial models should 
preferably be at least quadratic, or degree 3.  
Regression results are given in Annex 4. We use them to predict the value of  &)B@C3@%A 
before a FIT decrease (Figure 8). Predictions cover a 40 weeks period. As expected, the graph 
shows a positive deviation before FIT decreases. However, the impact becomes negative 5 
weeks before.  
 
Figure 6 Simulation of the deviation of the first order derivate of module price from a business 
as usual scenario before a FIT decrease 
 
 
 
-0,006
-0,005
-0,004
-0,003
-0,002
-0,001
0
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
Deviation
Time before a FIT decrease (weeks)
24 
 
These results are easy to interpret: In order to be able to connect the PV installation before 
the FIT decreases, firms installing PV systems need to buy the modules a few weeks before 
for small projects, or a few months for big installations. This boosts module demand during 
the months before the FIT cuts, and therefore increases the module price. A few weeks before 
the decreases, firms lose this incentive since there is not enough time to complete the 
installation and connect it to the grid before the FIT changes. This lowers the demand, 
decreasing the module price, which encourages firms to wait to benefit from this reduction, 
eventually decreasing price even more. Our results indicates that this happens five weeks 
before the decrease. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper aimed to analyse the influence of feed-in tariffs and silicon prices on module 
prices. We rely on a database of silicon and module weekly spot price, and FIT values in 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and France from January 2005 to May 2012. We find the direction of 
causality relations using Granger causality tests on vector-autoregressive (VAR) models.  
Granger causality tests show that since the end of the period of silicon shortage in 2009, 
module price variations cause changes in FITs, and not vice versa.  This is good news as it 
suggests that regulators have been able to prevent FITs to inflate module prices, limiting the 
creation of rents in the PV panel industry. This can be explained by the fierce competition 
prevailing on the module market, keeping module price close to production cost whatever the 
FITs level.  
Nevertheless, polynomial growth models show FIT short-term effects on module price. In 
the months before the FIT decreases, the module price increases. The interpretation is 
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straightforward: a higher demand triggered by market anticipation, accelerate installations 
before the FIT level decreases. This inflation is temporary, however. 
The analysis also suggests that the silicon price was driving module price only during the 
silicon shortage, suggesting that silicon producers had market power. This is in line with the 
observation of production under capacity and a low contestability of the silicon market before 
2009. After the end of the shortage period, they lost their market power and we find that 
module prices now drive silicon prices. This can be explained by an increasing competition 
with new players entering the market, including many Chinese corporations such as LDK 
Solar, which directed the situation from shortage to excess production. 
This study shows that price formation in the PV industry is very complex, and difficult to 
predict. It follows that FIT mechanisms should be sufficiently flexible to avoid important gaps 
in PV electricity cost when price evolution has not been anticipated correctly. So far, 
flexibility has been allowed by several means: a) implementing unscheduled modifications, b) 
increasing the frequency of FITs change, and c) making changes dependent on previous PV 
installation through volume responsive mechanisms. Unscheduled FIT changes are certainly 
not a good solution since they increase the uncertainty in the PV industry. More frequent FIT 
changes allow a faster adaptation to module price. Moreover, a higher frequency implies 
lower size, reducing the magnitude of the price distortions around FIT changes. The volume 
responsive aspect enables fast responses to the market, and the transparent process gives 
visibility to investors. 
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Annex 
 
A1 Sources for FIT values 
International Energy Agency (http://www.iea.org) 
Solar Feed In Tariff website (http://www.solarfeedintariff.net) 
PV Magazine (http://www.pv-magazine.com/) 
RES LEGAL website (http://www.res-legal.de/)  
Solarenergie-Förderverein Deutschland 
(http://www.sfv.de/druckver/lokal/mails/sj/verguetu.htm) 
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A2 Clemonte-Montañés-Reyes test for unit root applied to log (silicon price) 
 
 
 
The 238th value of the time series correspond to 22/07/2009 
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A3 Regression results of the BAU model (Equations 6 and 7) 
 
 Before After 
Dependent variable D. lnM$%&'() N D. lnM$%&'() N 
LD.	ln?@(@,%A 0.2160*** 
(0.041) 
- 
L2D.	ln?@(@,%A 0.0935** 
(0.041) 
- 
Constant 0.0006 
(0.001) 
-0.0022** 
(0.001) 
Observations 234 150 
R-squared 0.3746 0.0000 
Adj. R-squared 0.3692 0.0000 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Regression performed during 
the silicon shortage. L stands for the operator for Lag, F for Forward lag, and D for first order 
derivative. 
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A4 Regression results of the polynomial growth model (8) 
 
Dependent variable  &)B@C3@%A H)J%/)  0.001057984*** 
(0.000) 
H)J%/)2  -0.000039290*** 
(0.000) 
H)J%/)3  0.000000386* 
(0.000) 
Constant -0.005062572*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 380 
R-squared 0.0651 
Adj. R-squared 0.0576 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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